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PANEL DISCUSSION: REMEMBERING JUSTICE SCALIA IN IP 
CASES 
 
GRAEME DINWOODIE* 
JUSTICE SCALIA’S TRADEMARK OPINIONS 
When asked to discuss Justice Scalia’s trademark opinions, I thought I 
might be in some difficulty: I didn’t instantly recall that many trademark 
opinions that Justice Scalia had authored. The number does get bigger if 
you’re willing to include opinions that involved any interpretation of the 
Lanham Act, but these are probably driven by considerations that don’t tell 
you much about Justice Scalia’s views of trademark law. In that category, 
for example, I would put the College Savings Bank case on abrogation of 
11th amendment immunity, which is not surprisingly driven by views of the 
11th Amendment. And likewise, although Justice Scalia was not the author 
of it, the potentially important dissent with Justice Thomas in the B&B case 
was driven by views on the applicability of issue estoppel in the context of 
administrative bodies. So you can find a larger universe of cases if one 
expands the scope of cases that are treated as “Justice Scalia’s trademark 
opinions.” 
But I am going to focus on two opinions that Justice Scalia did author 
for the Court in cases that deal with two important substantive issues of 
trademark law. Those issues are: determining when a trademark exists, and 
what is the scope of protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act—that 
is, I will focus on Wal-Mart v. Samara from 2000 and Dastar from 2003. 
After recalling the basic reasoning of both cases, I will address three 
questions as regards each case. First, with hindsight, how significant were 
these two opinions for trademark and unfair competition law? Second, can 
one discern from those opinions a consistent philosophy towards trademark 
and unfair competition law. And, third, given that Justice Scalia’s approach 
to statutory interpretation has been written about heavily—indeed, he wrote 
about it at length himself—do those cases either mirror or depart from his 
normal methods of interpretation. 
 
 * University Professor at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, as well as the Intellectual Property 
Chair at the University of Oxford. This article is adapted from remarks delivered on September 22, 2016, 
at the Chicago-Kent Supreme Court IP Review. The panel was moderated by Joseph Oldaker, Nelson 
Bumgardner PC. 
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I start with a caution: any social scientist will tell you that taking two 
data points, and trying to extrapolate, suggests that I might be way off the 
mark in drawing any general lessons. But, I will throw some ideas out there 
and perhaps they’ll be validated by the patent and other opinions being 
discussed here. 
Since these cases were decided some time ago, let me briefly summarize 
the cases. In Wal-Mart v. Samara, the plaintiff argued that it had trade dress 
rights in the product design of a particular children’s clothing in a seersucker 
fashion, and that when Wal-Mart copied the designs, it engaged in trademark 
infringement. The plaintiff also sued under copyright law, but that was not 
directly before the Court. The issues on which certiorari was granted was 
“what is the test by which to determine an inherently distinctive product 
design.” A few years before, in Two Pesos, the Supreme Court had 
acknowledged that trade dress could be inherently distinctive but had not 
addressed how to determine whether any particular trade dress had that 
status. In the meantime, the Circuits had gone in different directions trying 
to answer that question. 
As a preliminary matter, the oral argument in this case was interesting 
given Justice Scalia’s historically active participation in oral argument. 
Something happened at oral argument in Wal-Mart that I think heavily 
determined the outcome of the case. You see, it mentioned in Justice Scalia’s 
opinion. One of the tests being considered was from a CCPA case called 
Seabrook; one of the parties and the government, in their amicus briefs, both 
argued that the Court should endorse that test for determining inherent 
distinctiveness. At the oral argument, the Deputy Solicitor General was 
asked: “Well, how would you apply Seabrook in this case?” He answered, 
basically, “I have no idea how this clothing design would fare under 
Seabrook.” Justice Scalia considered this a sure sign that Seabrook was not 
a very good test if one was concerned with offering producers and their 
competitors with some degree of certainty. And given the problems with 
finding a satisfactory test, the Court’s response may not be unsurprising: you 
don’t need to know what the test is because we hold that there is no such 
thing as inherently distinctive product design trade dress. 
I’m not an unbiased observer on this question because twenty years ago 
I wrote a very long article called “Reconceptualizing the Inherent 
Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress.” So, my first response to 
Wal-Mart was to think it was wrong, having just spent a lot of time 
explaining how to embrace a different approach. Looking back 16 years 
later, I’m more ambivalent about the significance of this case and whether it 
was right or wrong. Wal-Mart was part of the more general effort to roll back 
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from the high-water mark, if that’s the right term, of Two Pesos in 1992. 
And, especially when you pair it with the TrafFix case, successfully argued 
by John Roberts a year later on functionality, there is a consistent message. 
Qualitex was probably a pivot point where the Court said, “Yes you can 
protect color but only in certain circumstances;” Wal-Mart was the first 
confirmation of the change in direction. This retrenchment against product 
design trade dress has been very effective work over sixteen years in 
stopping a very large number of nuisance claims. As a result—arguably, at 
least, as a result—protection of design has shifted from the trademark 
system, which was operating as a quasi-design system in the United States, 
to the design patent system, which has been rejuvenated over the last decade, 
and indeed perhaps also to copyright. This is interesting because in the next 
session, we will have a discussion of two cases pending before the Court this 
year: one on design patent and one on copyright protection of designs. 
And if you look at Justice Scalia’s opinion in Wal-Mart, that is exactly 
what he thought should have happened. He said that plaintiffs should not 
worry about lesser protection by trade dress because they will still have 
copyright and design patent. This was a very explicit part of what was his 
driving force. So, the case arguably has achieved what Justice Scalia sought 
out to achieve. And, on the whole, this has probably been a good 
development in trademark law. I still think, unlike many American scholars, 
that product design trade dress claims should be more viable than they are, 
because consumers actually associate product shapes with source more than 
conventional wisdom suggests. But on the whole, Wal-Mart was a 
significant decision that pushed the law to where Justice Scalia wanted it to 
be. 
What do I get from the Wal-Mart opinion in terms of trademark 
philosophy? One way to approach this question is to compare Two Pesos, 
eight years before, in which Justice Scalia wrote a very short concurrence. 
His concurrence was, in essence, “I agree with Justice White who has 
reached this conclusion that you can have inherently distinctive trade dress, 
though he has reached that result through purposive reading of the statute, 
and reference to legislative history. And I agree with Justice Thomas’ 
separate opinion, in which he reaches the same conclusion based upon 
analysis of the evolving common law, which he correctly says has been 
reflected in, but not replaced by, the Lanham Act.” 
Justice Thomas’ opinion in Two Pesos was to some extent an embrace 
of the idea of the Lanham Act as a delegating statute, rather like some 
antitrust legislation. It was not as full an embrace of that proposition as one 
finds from, say, Judge Leval in the Second Circuit. But Justice Thomas 
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certainly acknowledged that there was a role for judges in developing 
trademark law in partnership with Congress. In short, the opinion suggested 
a judicial role in lawmaking that was perhaps not what one would readily 
associate with Justice Scalia (though antitrust is an interesting comparison). 
Interestingly, when Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart gave reasons why there 
was no possibility of inherently distinctive trade dress, he started with the 
point that the text of the statute told him absolutely nothing—which is an 
interesting proposition in any Scalia opinion. Although in the end, Justice 
Scalia did use other parts of the statute to support the importance of the 
distinction between inherent distinctiveness and acquired distinctiveness. He 
also relied on the proposition, drawn from Justice Stevens’ separate opinion 
in Two Pesos, that the standard for registerability under Section 2 of the 
Lanham Act and protectability under Section 43(a) are largely the same. This 
is going to be a live issue for the Washington Redskins, depending upon what 
the Court decides in the pending Tam case. So, Wal-Mart is not a particularly 
textualist opinion. 
The second concern driving Justice Scalia in Wal-Mart—and this gets 
back to the point of the question to the Deputy Solicitor-General at oral 
argument—is the need of certainty in a competitive climate. Justice Scalia 
thought that endorsing a test that could not easily be applied to the design in 
the case before the Court suggested that cases involving assertions of 
inherently distinctive design could rarely be resolved at the stage of summary 
judgement, inviting too many nuisance lawsuits. Justice Scalia thought that 
was anti-competitive—not because the meritless claim would succeed, but 
that it could not easily be dismissed without substantial costs, giving rise to 
hold-up potential. 
Justice Scalia expressed the consumer interest tied up in that 
competitiveness analysis as the interest in having lower-priced goods rather 
than the interest in being protected from confusion—which is the consumer 
interest that you tend see highlighted in trademark cases. So, what I see in 
that opinion is a vision of trademark law as more than a mere consumer 
protection law, which is of course one vision of trademark law. Justice Scalia 
saw trademark law as part of broader industrial and economic policy, where 
trademark law is concerned with the regulation of competition. I think that 
you see this in Dastar as well, where certainty again loomed large. 
A third driver of Wal-Mart is that Justice Scalia tried to see trademark 
law as part of the larger intellectual property picture, including design patent 
and copyright. And, again, he comes back to this in Dastar, so I will discuss 
this in a moment. 
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One final observation about Wal-Mart. Justice Scalia may not have 
considered himself an expert in some of the scientific matters coming before 
the Court in patent cases, but he saw himself as a prototypical consumer. He 
displays this in both Wal-Mart and Dastar. In Wal-Mart, he commented that, 
“It seems to us that consumers would not be predisposed to look at shape and 
think of source.” And likewise, in Dastar, he says, “I don’t think the 
consumer cares about the source of the content of a communicative product 
such as a sound recording or movie.” Justice Scalia presented these views as 
empiricism—in Wal-Mart, to justify not accepting the possibility of 
inherently distinctive design trade dress. It’s an intriguing starting point, 
though one that he backed up with a series of normative policy objections 
that supported the conclusion he came to empirically. That reveals something 
about distinctiveness that has too often been missed by American courts. 
Distinctiveness is a mix of empirical and normative analysis. Justice Scalia 
took into account empiricism, even if it came from his own “expertise,” but 
colored that empirical analysis with awareness of normative concerns. 
In Dastar, the copyright had expired on television programs that were 
based upon a book about Eisenhower’s Crusades in Europe. Dastar acquired 
the physical tapes that embodied the television series, edited them, and 
repackaged them as their own. On the packaging, Dastar did not mention that 
most of the content was produced by third parties in creating the television 
series, the copyright in which, if it was in any way still extant, belonged to 
Fox. The case was not brought as a copyright claim, however, because the 
copyright in the television series had expired. Instead, the action is brought 
as a so-called “false designation of origin” claim under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act. 
Putting aside the wisdom of allowing an unfair competition claim to 
afford what is effectively copyright protection, Dastar is a disastrously-
reasoned decision on any number of grounds. But one ground is that the real 
basis for the decision is obscured. For Justice Scalia, perhaps driven by his 
textualism, the outcome turns on the dictionary definition of the term 
“origin.” And that turns out to be the unhelpful focus of a series of Seventh 
Circuit cases applying Dastar over the last couple of years. 
Some of the same policy themes as we saw in Wal-Mart are also 
evident, however. And it would have been more useful had these been front 
and center. For example, we see again the concern of uncertainty. At oral 
argument, counsel for Fox was asked, “If instead of not crediting you, Dastar 
had credited you, wouldn’t you just sue them for false affiliation or 
association of endorsement?” Counsel for Fox reassured that they would not 
have done that. But under the plaintiff’s argument, they could have done that. 
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It was a plausible claim. Thus, Dastar would be sued if they did one thing, 
and sued if they did exactly the opposite. No competitors—operating legally 
to work with public domain material—can exist in that climate. And, again 
as in Wal-Mart, cumulation of rights was part of the picture; the Court was 
not willing to allow the circumvention of copyright law, by endorsing what 
it called a “mutant” copyright claim. This would have been the clearest basis 
on which to ground the decision, but it was thrown in with a mix of textual 
and other policy reasons. For example, again the driven is ostensibly 
informed by Justice Scalia’s belief that consumers would not care who 
actually came up with the ideas behind Crusades in Europe. All they were 
concerned about was the physical tape. As an empirical observation about 
movies, I find that hard to accept. 
TEXTUALISM 
The strictness of Justice Scalia’s adherence to textualism varies in the 
two trademark cases I mentioned. Between Two Pesos and Wal-Mart, on the 
one hand, and Dastar, on the other, Justice Scalia becomes far less 
comfortable with the idea of the Lanham Act as a delegating statute. To be 
fair, in Two Pesos and Wal-Mart, it would have been really hard to rely on 
textualism. And in Wal-Mart, although he relied on general policy arguments 
and purposive interpretation, he did try to find some textual reference points, 
even though none directly answered the question. In Dastar, Justice Scalia 
was able to find a textual hook, which was the word “origin.” However, if 
you pled the Section 43(a) claims slightly differently, you could have 
brought a claim invoking that provision without involving the word “origin;” 
it’s actually not that hard to do that. But one of the problems that emanated 
from Dastar is that once you have defined “origin” merely as it is found in 
the dictionary—as the source of the tangible product on which a mark was 
impressed—you create problems for cases arising in the 21st century. You 
develop very wooden approaches to unfair competition cases. Instead, if 
Justice Scalia had emphasized what was actually going on in Dastar—this 
was clearly an attempt to circumvent the fact that you had a copyrighted 
work that was in the public domain—and relied on the policy prohibition 
against mutant copyrights as the ground for the decision, then the courts 
would likely have developed a more coherent body of law going forward. 
And so, I think his textualism actually makes Dastar a less useful opinion 
than it would have been had it been ground in a non-textual basis. 
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CASES WITH THE GREATEST IMPACT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Both the cases that I discussed have had important effects already. But 
the case that I will identify as an outside bet for significance—and this is 
very speculative—is a Lanham Act case that is not properly a trademark 
case. It is a false advertising case; false advertising is litigated under the 
Lanham Act but under the second part of Section 43(a). The case is the 
Lexmark case about standing in a false advertising action. In Lexmark, the 
Supreme Court endorsed a pretty general, and generally used, standing test, 
looking both at the zone of interest and remoteness of harms. It probably 
didn’t dramatically change false advertising claims, but Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning suggests that the standard for standing was fully applicable to all 
Lanham Act cases. And you are now seeing those standing arguments from 
43(a)(1)(B) cases—false advertising cases—pop up in regular trademark 
cases. For example, it was argued in the Slep-Tone case on Section 43(a) 
actions involving digital goods in the Seventh Circuit, even though that 
wasn’t the basis for the ultimate opinion. And there’s a recent Fourth Circuit 
opinion, Bayer v. Belmora, on well-known marks, which addresses the 
ability to protect marks that have never been used or registered in the United 
States but which are well known elsewhere (in that case, in Mexico). The 
Fourth Circuit decided the question by applying a Lexmark framework (and 
the case is being pursued further, before the Supreme Court).  
This litigation strategy of invoking Lexmark connects well to 
developments in recent scholarly writing, most notably that of Rebecca 
Tushnet of Georgetown. She argues that some of the limits that one finds in 
Section 43(a) false advertising cases should be transposed to trademark 
cases. This might bring in concepts like materiality. But it also makes 
Lexmark a live argument. The Lexmark test gives judges plenty of scope to 
work out what is a real and actionable “harm” to a trademark—for example, 
what is a direct harm versus an indirect harm—and thus has the capacity to 
shrink the scope of actions under Section 43(a), including the trademark part 
as well as the false advertising part. So if I had to make a prediction of one 
case, which at the moment, would have little effect but that actually might 
be significant, I would predict Lexmark. 
 
